Source-control trust
Branch protection, required reviews, signed commits, GitHub Apps and PATs scope, dependency-bot trust, third-party Action trust.
Dependency trust, build-system integrity, secret handling in CI, artifact signing, deployment-credential blast radius, GitOps trust chains. Every place an attacker could ship code into your production environment without writing a line of yours.
What we audit in a supply-chain engagement.
Branch protection, required reviews, signed commits, GitHub Apps and PATs scope, dependency-bot trust, third-party Action trust.
CI runner isolation, secrets injection, cache poisoning risk, build provenance, reproducibility of artifacts.
Direct and transitive dependencies, typosquatting risk, package signing, lockfile integrity. Coverage of npm, PyPI, Maven, Go modules, Cargo, NuGet, RubyGems.
Base-image trust, layer provenance, vuln scanning at build vs run, registry signing, deploy-key blast radius.
Sigstore / cosign / SLSA adoption, verification at admission (Kyverno / OPA / native), key rotation policy.
ArgoCD / Flux trust model, deployment-credential scope, rollback authorization, environment promotion gates.
How a supply-chain audit runs.
Supply-chain audit deliverables.
Diagram from developer commit to running container. Every trust boundary marked. Useful for next year's audit too.
Each finding shows the exploit path, not just the misconfiguration. Severity reflects blast radius.
Concrete actions for branch protection, required reviews, secret-scope reduction, build-runner isolation.
If you want to harden further: realistic adoption plan with effort estimate and what each level buys.
OPA / Kyverno / native policies for image signing, registry trust, and deploy gating.
A short doc your engineers actually read. What to do, what to avoid, who to ask when the workflow blocks.
When this audit matters.
Action ecosystems are increasingly the attack surface. Third-party Actions run with your secrets. We map the trust and tighten it.
Container supply chain has more moving parts than most teams realize. Base images, layer caches, registries, admission policy.
GitOps shifts the trust boundary from CD pipeline to repo. New attack surface; audit it.
Customer or government ask. SLSA Level 2 or 3 is the new baseline expectation for enterprise sales.
Supply-chain FAQ.
SBOM is part of it, not the whole. We care about the trust chain, not just the package list. SBOM accuracy and currency are checked.
No. Org-reader and CI-reader is enough for most findings. Admin needed only if you want us to implement the recommendations.
We audit it. Self-hosted runners are a common compromise path, especially when shared across repos.
We scan and triage. Most teams have at least one. We document, recommend rotation, and write a detection rule for the next time.
Yes. Model weights, training data, evaluation datasets are increasingly part of the supply chain. Ask if your AI features should be in scope.
60-minute call covers your stack and the most likely top-three findings before we quote.